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motor response that leads to the same reinforcement for
the mouse. We speculate that there may be an added
savings in the GNG task that makes the discrimination
and response easier. The mechanisms may involve
some of the areas that are connected in feedforward
or feedback arrangements with the olfactory bulb or cor-
tex (Shipley and Adamek, 1984; Sobel et al., 1998). For
most of the mice in the Rinberg et al. ZAC, while the an-
imals enjoy better accuracy with longer sampling, the
accuracy levels for the most difficult task are not as
high at asymptote as those for the easiest task. Further-
more, sampling time increases are larger than in the
prior study (on the order of 200–500 ms). In the Abraham
et al. GNG task, accuracy is close to 100% with 70–
100 ms longer sampling times for the more difficult dis-
criminations.
One issue that the increase in sampling times for
harder odor discriminations addresses is time evolution
of spatial and temporal structure of odorant representa-
tions (Friedrich, 2006; Spors and Grinvald, 2002). In ze-
brafish these patterns evolve into more specific repre-
sentations by about 400 ms and can persist for up to
1.5 s, but the question has arisen that if an animal can
do the discrimination in a very brief time, what are these
extended temporal codes used for? They could be used
for representation of more specific odor features or even
behavioral elements associated with the odorants, as it
appears that mice do gain something with extra time. It
has been shown that disruption of fast oscillatory coor-
dination among insect antennal lobe projection neurons
impairs fine odor discrimination, and, inversely, en-
hancement of fast oscillatory coordination among mam-
malian olfactory bulb mitral cells improves fine odor dis-
crimination (Kay and Stopfer, 2006). What is needed is to
examine the system physiology during the two different
tasks in intact animals to determine whether and what
central structures might be differentially involved in
each task. Are sustained oscillations produced in re-
sponse to difficult-to-discriminate odorants during the
extra sampling time, similar to those seen in locusts,
honeybees, and zebrafish (Kay and Stopfer, 2006; Lau-
rent, 2002)? Owing to the disparity in time increases
for the two tasks, we ask whether the system is doing
the same thing during the extra 200–500 ms in the ZAC
as it is doing during the 70–100 ms in the GNG task.
We suspect that the performance improvement in the
GNG task does take large advantage of the inputs to
the olfactory bulb from higher-order reward and cogni-
tive circuits, as we have shown previously (Kay and
Freeman, 1998; Martin et al., 2006). In this case, the stim-
ulus would not be processed separately from its mean-
ing, and its neural representation would involve a net-
work extending beyond the olfactory structures.
Finally, since we know that mice and rats can be very
good at discriminating very small differences among
odorants, we ask whether the tasks that we neurophys-
iologists use are the best ones for evaluating perfor-
mance ability in these animals. The tasks certainly
help us to uncover the behavioral and physiological
mechanisms that can operate in this system, but what
else can the system do? Is it that mice only strive for
adequacy, or that our means of assessing their abili-
ties only encourage them to rise to the level of good
enough?
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278Auditory Filters, Features, and
Redundant Representations
Responses in auditory cortex tend to be weaker, more
phasic, and noisier than those of auditory brainstem
and midbrain nuclei. Is the activity in cortex therefore
merely a ‘‘degraded echo’’ of lower-level neural repre-
sentations? In this issue of Neuron, Chechik and
colleagues show that, while cortical responses indeed
convey less sensory information than auditory mid-
brain neurons, their responses are also much less
redundant.
Recent years have seen a steady and sustained increase
in the number of studies aiming to understand the work-
ings of auditory cortex, but despite many ingenious
experiments and meticulous studies, auditory cortex re-
mains much less well understood than its visual coun-
terpart. It is as if each new experiment uncovers a new
and sometimes unexpected piece of a great puzzle,
but so far the various pieces steadfastly refuse to fall to-
gether to form a coherent picture. Thus, central auditory
processing seems a great deal more complicated (or, as
auditory researchers would put it, a great deal more ‘‘in-
teresting’’) than its visual counterpart. The gaps in our
understanding of the auditory system are particularly
marked in the field of auditory object recognition. Visual
objects lend themselves to stylized representations, for
example through line drawings, and ever since Hubel
and Wiesel’s classic work, line segments and edges
have been recognized as ‘‘archetypal’’ low-level visual
features. They are easily detected by simple cells in pri-
mary visual cortex while complex cells signal their
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279presence in a somewhat position invariant manner. As
one ascends the visual processing stream toward infra-
temporal cortex, one finds neurons which are selective
to specific, complex, and increasingly abstracted com-
binations of such low-level features. In this manner,
these neurons become detectors of essential feature
combinations which characterize particular visual ob-
jects irrespective of the precise position, size, or con-
trast of the visual stimulus. These transformations can
be modeled in a biologically plausible manner, as has
been done, for example, in the VisNet model developed
by Rolls and colleagues (Elliffe et al., 2002; Rolls and
Treves, 1998), and while it might be premature to con-
clude that vision is ‘‘solved,’’ there are at least very
good indications as to how visual object recognition
might work.
One might think that auditory object recognition could
similarly be done through a processing hierarchy
wherein neurons at successively higher levels become
responsive to increasingly complex and diverse combi-
nations of low-level features. But auditory neuroscien-
tists are not yet in a position to confirm this, and their ef-
forts are at least in part hampered by the fact that we still
have no suitable set of low-level auditory features that
might be considered the auditory equivalent of the line
segment. Certainly, Fourier analysis allows us to decom-
pose any arbitrary sound into pure tone components,
but in a natural sound the temporal interrelations of
acoustic features are all important, and Fourier analysis
fails to capture these in an intuitive manner. It is there-
fore not surprising that auditory neuroscientists are
increasingly turning away from pure tones and use either
artificial stimuli, rich in temporal modulations (Escabi
et al., 2003; Garcia-Lazaro et al., 2006; Klein et al.,
2000), or recordings of natural sounds, possibly after
some suitable manipulation (Nelken et al., 1999;
Schnupp et al., 2006; Wang and Kadia, 2001).
One interesting new study which embraces this later
approach is published in this issue of Neuron (Chechik
et al., 2006). In this study, Chechik and colleagues re-
corded the responses of single neurons to a battery of
‘‘raw’’ and manipulated bird song recordings at three
key stages of the cat central auditory pathway, namely
the inferior colliculus (IC), the medial geniculate nucleus
(MGN), and the primary auditory cortex (A1). All three
structures are known to have a tonotopic organization,
and the traditional, although somewhat simplistic, view
is that each of these stages can therefore be thought
of as a set of frequency-tuned neural filter banks. Natu-
rally, if the neurons are merely frequency filters, then
neurons with similar frequency tuning should give es-
sentially similar responses. Frequency tuning curves in
the central auditory pathways are often broad and over-
lapping, and one would therefore expect to see a fair
amount of ‘‘redundancy’’ in the neural population re-
sponse, as a number of similarly tuned neurons should
tell us very similar things about any given stimulus.
The results presented by Chechik et al. (2006) indicate
that this expectation is largely borne out at the level of
the IC, but, surprisingly, appears not to apply at the level
of the auditory cortex.
Of course, whether the responses in two simulta-
neously recorded neurons appear ‘‘similar’’ and there-
fore ‘‘redundant’’ may depend critically on which mea-sure of the neural response one considers important.
For example, two neural responses may be very similar
in overall spike count, yet exhibit crucial differences in
their temporal discharge pattern (Schnupp et al.,
2006). To achieve a measure of redundancy which is
largely independent of assumptions about the relevant
response metric, Chechik and colleagues resorted to
an information theoretic analysis of a variety of different
neural response metrics, but obtained the same result in
each case.
Information theory views neural spike trains and sen-
sory stimuli as random variables and quantifies their
interdependence by a measure known as mutual infor-
mation. If two random events x and y are entirely inde-
pendent of each other, then observing x cannot tell
you anything about y, and the probability of x and y oc-
curring together p(x,y) would equal the product of their
individual probabilities p(x) 3 p(y). Information theory
therefore quantifies the mutual information between x
and y as a departure from independence, and quantifies
this as the logarithm of the ratio p(x,y)/(p(x) 3 p(y)). For
independent x and y this ratio evaluates to one and the
log of one is zero, i.e., x carries no information about y.
The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to
quantify the information content of a neural spike train
without having to make any assumptions about how
the spike train ought to be decoded. However, in order
to calculate the information content of a neural response
precisely, one needs to know the value of the joint prob-
ability p(x,y) of any possible spike train x to occur to-
gether with any possible stimulus y. While getting very
accurate estimates for these probability distributions
can be very difficult in practice, there are nevertheless
good reasons to believe that reasonably accurate esti-
mates of the information content of the response of an
auditory neuron can be obtained (Nelken et al., 2005).
From determining the information content of individual
neural responses it is a relatively small step to quantify-
ing the informational redundancy of pairs of neural re-
sponses. For independently firing neurons, the informa-
tion conveyed by each should sum, and redundancy can
be quantified as a departure from this expectation of
additive information.
In the IC, Chechik et al. (2006) found neural responses
to be highly redundant, a fact that they attribute largely
to stimulus-induced correlations in the neural firing
patterns. Responses of neurons in auditory cortex car-
ried on average less information per response than
those in IC, but the informational redundancy between
pairs of cortical neurons was also much lower. The de-
cline in the information content of individual responses
in cortex relative to IC was to be expected. It is in large
part attributable to the lower mean response firing rates
seen in cortex, and to a lesser extent an inevitable con-
sequence of the data processing inequality, a physical
law which states that subsequent levels of any informa-
tion processing system, unable to invent new informa-
tion, can at best do a tolerably good job at preserving
the information passed up from previous levels. Conse-
quently, the often divergent connections in sensory
pathways lead to the seemingly peculiar situation that
the activity of increasingly larger numbers of neurons
represents ever smaller total amounts of sensory infor-
mation.
The Lure of the Unknown
Using event-related fMRI, Bunzeck and Du¨zel show
that midbrain regions putatively housing dopamine
cell bodies activate more for novel pictures than for
negative pictures, pictures requiring a motor response,
or repeated pictures. These findings indicate that mid-
brain regions preferentially respond to novelty and
suggest that novelty can serve as its own reward.
Meriwether Lewis and William Clark spent years working
at it, Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay climbed Mt.
Everest for it, Neil Armstrong flew into space for it, and
Robert Falcon Scott died for it—a chance to discover
something never before seen. A long tradition of human
exploration testifies to the motivating force of novelty.
Evolutionary biologists have argued that in order to
flourish, all foraging species must have a drive to ex-
plore the unknown (Panksepp, 1998). How such a drive
manifests in the brain, though, has remained unclear.
In this issue of Neuron, for the first time, Bunzeck and
Du¨zel (2006) show that midbrain regions that putatively
house dopamine neurons preferentially respond to
novel rather than rare, arousing, or behaviorally relevant
stimuli (Bunzeck and Du¨zel, 2006).
From the outside, the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and
substantia nigra (SN) are easy to miss. Nestled deep in
a bend of the brainstem, these nuclei house the bodies
of most of the dopamine neurons that innervate the
striatum and prefrontal cortex. Tract tracing studies
indicate that while the VTA projects to more ventral re-
gions of the striatum and prefrontal cortex, the SN pro-
jects to more dorsal and lateral regions of the striatum
and prefrontal cortex. Though small, these nuclei are in
a position to exert widespread influence. Indeed, from
the inside, life without these midbrain neurons is far
from easy. For instance, both organic lesions (due to
Parkinson’s disease) and synthetic lesions (due to im-
properly manufactured drugs) of the SN/VTA lead to
mental and physical immobility.
While lesion studies suggest that dorsal pathways in-
nervated by the SN play a role in movement, ventral
pathways innervated by the VTA play a less-understood
role in motivation (Haber and Fudge, 1997). Some prom-
inent theories hypothesize that activity in this ventral
pathway confers ‘‘salience’’ upon stimuli (Berridge and
Robinson, 1993). However, theorists have defined sa-
lience differently, confounding empirical attempts to
isolate the function of these nuclei. For instance, some
definitions of salience invoke novelty, others invoke be-
havioral relevance, and still others invoke arousal.
Here, Bunzeck and Du¨zel operationally define ‘‘sa-
lience’’ in four different ways. During acquisition of
event-related fMRI, the investigators showed subjects
pictures of faces or outdoor scenes embodying different
attributes of salience and then measured the SN/VTA
response to these different stimuli. A first group of pic-
tures was novel, or never seen before. A second group
of pictures was behaviorally relevant, requiring a button
press. A third group of pictures was negative and thus
presumed to be arousing (i.e., a negative expression in
the case of faces, or a car accident in the case of scenes).
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sponse is therefore inevitable, the sharp decline in infor-
mational redundancy is not, and it is very interesting to
consider what the reasons and the purpose behind
this redundancy reduction might be. Ed Rolls’ VisNet
model of cortical visual object processing also exhibits
a redundancy reduction at successively higher levels
of the processing stream. There the redundancy reduc-
tion arises as higher levels of the network become sen-
sitive to increasingly abstract feature combinations. In
the VisNet model, redundancy reduction is therefore a
hallmark of a transition from a ‘‘feature-based’’ to an
‘‘object-based’’ representation, and it is intriguing to
speculate that the redundancy reduction in the auditory
pathway described by Chechik et al. (2006) might simi-
larly be interpreted as the fingerprint of a transition
from an acoustic-based feature toward a more ‘‘auditory
object-based’’ representation.
The VisNet model is not ‘‘born’’ with a low-redun-
dancy representation of its stimuli in its top layers. The
redundancy reduction only arises after a competitive
learning process in which higher layers become sensi-
tive to specific feature combinations (Rolls and Treves,
1998; Rolls, 1995). One might predict that the low-
redundancy representations observed at the levels of
the auditory cortex may similarly be the result of devel-
opmental or learning mechanisms which decorrelate the
responses of individual cortical neurons. This could
easily be tested by measuring redundancy in the cortex
of young, naive animals with little auditory experience.
Achieving a low-redundancy representation in auditory
cortex could well be an important part of learning how
to hear.
Jan Schnupp1
1Department of Physiology, Anatomy, and Genetics
Sherrington Building
University of Oxford
Oxford OX1 3PT
United Kingdom
Selected Reading
Chechik, G., Anderson, M.J., Bar-Yosef, O., Young, E.D., Tishby, N.,
and Nelken, I. (2006). Neuron 51, this issue, 359–368.
Elliffe, M.C., Rolls, E.T., and Stringer, S.M. (2002). Biol. Cybern. 86,
59–71.
Escabi, M.A., Miller, L.M., Read, H.L., and Schreiner, C.E. (2003).
J. Neurosci. 23, 11489–11504.
Garcia-Lazaro, J.A., Ahmed, B., and Schnupp, J.W. (2006). Curr.
Biol. 16, 264–271.
Klein, D.J., Depireux, D.A., Simon, J.Z., and Shamma, S.A. (2000).
J. Comput. Neurosci. 9, 85–111.
Nelken, I., Rotman, Y., and Bar Yosef, O. (1999). Nature 397, 154–
157.
Nelken, I., Chechik, G., Mrsic-Flogel, T.D., King, A.J., and Schnupp,
J.W. (2005). J. Comput. Neurosci. 19, 199–221.
Rolls, E.T. (1995). Behav. Brain Res. 66, 177–185.
Rolls, E., and Treves, A. (1998). Neural Networks and Brain Function
(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press).
Schnupp, J.W., Hall, T.M., Kokelaar, R.F., and Ahmed, B. (2006).
J. Neurosci. 26, 4785–4795.
Wang, X., and Kadia, S.C. (2001). J. Neurophysiol. 86, 2616–2620.
DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2006.07.016
